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Abstract: 
This paper addresses the intergenerational transmission of education and investigates the 
extent to which early school leaving (at age 16) may be due to variations in parental 
background. An important contribution of the paper is to distinguish between the causal 
effects of parental income and parental education levels.  Least squares estimation reveals 
conventional results – weak effects of income (when the child is 16), stronger effects of 
maternal education than paternal, and stronger effects on sons than daughters. We find that 
the education effects remain significant even when household income is included. However, 
when we use instrumental variable methods to simultaneously account for the endogeneity 
of parental education and paternal income, only maternal education remains significant (for 
daughters only) and becomes stronger. These estimates are consistent to various set of 
instruments. The impact of paternal income varies between specifications but become 
insignificant in our preferred specification. Our results provide limited evidence that policies 
alleviating income constraints at age 16 can alter schooling decisions but that policies 
increasing permanent income would lead to increased  participation (especially for 
daughters). There is also evidence of intergenerational transmissions of education choice 
from mothers to daughters.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
A considerable literature has focused on the effects of parental background on outcomes of 
their children such as cognitive skills, education, health and subsequent income (for a review 
see Black and Devereux, 2010).  There is little doubt that economic status is positively 
correlated across generations. Parents affect the behaviour and decisions taken by their 
children through genetic transmission, environment, and preferences. The view that more 
educated parents can provide a “better” environment for their children has been the basis of 
many interventions.   
While the existence of intergenerational correlations is hardly disputed, the nature of 
the policy interventions that are suggested depends critically on the characteristics of the 
intergenerational transmission mechanism and the extent to which the relationship is causal.  
In particular, it has proven difficult to determine whether the transmission mechanism works 
through inherited genetic factors or environmental factors and, to the extent that it is the 
latter, what is the relative importance of education and income?  Moreover, the link between 
the schooling of parents and their children could be due to unobserved inherited 
characteristics rather than a causal effect of parental education or income per se in household 
production.  This issue is explored in detail in the review by Bjorklund and Salvanes (2010). 
The scientific literature is not entirely clear but it is widely believed that, while raising 
the education of both mothers and fathers has broadly similar effects on household income, 
the external effects on children associated with parental education are larger for maternal 
education than for paternal because mothers tend to be the main provider of care within the 
household. For example, a positive relationship between maternal education and their child’s 
birth weight, which is a strong predictor of child health, is found not only in the developing 
world but also in the US (see, for example, Currie and Moretti, 2003).  The existence of such 
externalities provides an important argument for subsidizing education, especially in 
households with low income and/or low educated parents.  Indeed there may be multiplier 
effects since policy interventions that increase educational attainment for one generation may 
create spillovers to later generations.   
A neglected issue is to understand the mechanisms by which parental education may 
affect children’s outcomes. That is, parental education may be a direct input into the 
production function that generates the quality of the endowments that children have in  
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various  domains (health, ability etc.), may affect the choice of other inputs, and may 
indirectly facilitate a higher quantity  and/or quality  of other inputs through its effect on 
household income. The use of policy instruments such as income transfers to attempt to break 
the cycle of disadvantage presumes this latter route is important. Moreover, once one controls 
for education (as a long-run determinant of the level of permanent income), current income is 
likely to pick up the effect of income shocks that would matter only in the presence of credit 
market constraints.   
This paper addresses an important issue in the existing literature: the causal effect of 
parental education on children, allowing for separate effects of maternal and paternal 
education; and the causal effect of household income controlling for education.  To date no 
study has simultaneously tried to account for the endogeneity of both parental education and 
parental income. The distinction between education and income is important since differences 
in policy approaches hang on their relative effects. Using a British cross-section dataset, we 
begin by confirming the usual finding using least squares - that parental education levels are 
positively associated with good child outcomes, in particular later school leaving.
1
 
1 We also investigate the relative effects of parental education levels and household income on educational 
achievement at age 16. High school students in England and Wales usually study up to ten subjects until the age 
of 16 which are then examined at the end of compulsory schooling in the school year that they reach 16. These 
are scored as A* to F with A* -C being regarded as passing grades. The government’s objective is that 60% of 
all 16 year olds pass in at least five subjects. This level of achievement is usually required to progress into senior 
high school. Not surprisingly the results of this exercise exactly parallel the results for early school leaving and 
so are not reported here but are available on request. 
  This 
outcome measure is important because the UK government has targeted a reduction in the 
proportion of pupils leaving at 16, and committed itself to a phased increase in the minimum 
age at which youths can leave education and training. We go on to use instrumental variable 
methods to take account of the endogeneity of both parental income and education.  We 
exploit a variety of ideas for identification that have been used in other research, including 
changes in the minimum school leaving age for the parents, month of birth of the parents 
which captures early school tracking that affected the parental cohorts, and parental union 
status and its interactions with occupation.   
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the existing literature. Section 3 
explains the nature of the data used. Section 4 provides the base estimates, which are 
extended and subjected to robustness checks in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Previous Literature 
It is widely thought that children brought up in less favourable conditions obtain less 
education despite the large financial returns to schooling (Heckman and Masterov,2004) and 
indeed there is a large correlation between the education level of parents and their children 
(Bjorklund and Salvanes, 2010). However the transmission mechanism behind such 
intergenerational correlations is not clear.  Krueger (2004) reviews various contributions 
supporting the view that financial constraints significantly impact on educational attainment. 
On the contrary, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) suggests that current parental income does 
not explain child educational choices, but that family fixed effects that contribute to 
permanent income, such as parental education levels, have a much more positive role.  This is 
the central conclusion of Cameron and Heckman (1998) using US data, and Chevalier and 
Lanot (2002) using the UK National Child Development Study data.  Chevalier (2004), using 
the UK Family Resources Survey cross-section data, finds that including father’s income in 
the schooling choice equation of the child, while itself having a significant and positive 
effect, does not dramatically change the magnitude of the parental education coefficients. 
However, the potential endogeneity of income means that this  correlation does not 
necessarily imply that parental income matters for children’s human capital accumulation. 
Indeed if income is endogenous and is correlated with parental education levels, then the 
education coefficients are also biased. 
In the literature to date, researchers have attempted to identify the exogenous effect of 
either parental education or of parental income, but not both effects simultaneously. The 
literature on estimating the causal effect of parental education on the child’s educational 
attainment has relied on three identification strategies: instrumental variables, adopted 
children, and twins. 
The first identification strategy is to use instrumental variables methods based on 
‘natural’ experiments or policy reforms that change the educational distribution of the parents 
without directly affecting children.  Black et al. (2003) exploit Norwegian educational  
 
4 
reforms which raised the minimum number of years of compulsory schooling over a period of 
time and at differential rates between regions of the country.  Some parents experienced an 
extra year of education compared to other parents who were similar to them in other respects 
except birth year.  This discontinuity is exploited to identify the effect of parental education 
on their children’s education.  They find evidence of the impact of parental education in the 
OLS estimates of education outcomes for the children but estimates based on IV show no 
such effect, with the exception of (weak) evidence of mother/son influences.  However, 
Oreopoulos et al. (2006) using the same approach and pooling US Census data from 1960, 
1970 and 1980 report that an increase in parental education by one year decreases the 
probability of a child repeating a schooling year (or grade) by between two and seven 
percentage points.  
The UK provides similar policy changes which are exploited in Chevalier (2004) and 
Galindo-Rueda (2003).  Changes in the minimum school leaving age which occurred just 
after World War II and again in the early 1970s meant that the educational choices of future 
parents was exogenously affected, at least for those wishing to leave school at the earliest 
age.  Chevalier (2004) finds that for both parents, OLS estimates of the effect of one year of 
parental education on the probability of post-compulsory education is about 4%, with the 
effects slightly larger for sons than daughters.  Using the 1974 change in the school leaving 
age legislation as an instrument for parental education, the effects of a parent’s education on 
the child of the same gender increased substantially (for a sample of biological parents).  
Galindo-Rueda (2003) exploited the earlier 1947 reform and, relying on regression 
discontinuity, find significant causal effects - but only for fathers.  
Of course, the minimum school leaving age is likely to affect the bottom of the 
schooling distribution more than the top so there is a clear case for thinking, in a 
heterogeneous effects model, that such estimates will provide only LATE estimates that are 
not strictly comparable to OLS. However, to the extent that policymakers are particularly 
concerned about early school leavers such estimates are still of interest. Other instruments, 
such as the 1968 rioting of French students (Maurin and McNally, 2008), or exogenous 
changes in the cost of education (Carneiro et al, 2007), or the GI bill (Page, 2009) all tend to 
support a positive causal effect of parental education on the human capital of children.  
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An alternative strategy to account for genetic effects is to compare adopted and 
natural children. Sacerdote (2007) report that, controlling for ability and assortative mating, 
the positive effect of maternal education on children’s education remains. Plug (2004) finds 
that paternal education matters more than maternal (which becomes insignificant) when the 
two parental effects are included in the adopted sample and that income does not affect these 
conclusions. This literature assumes that the presence of adopted children is uncorrelated 
with unobservables across families.  However adopted and natural children may have 
different characteristics, be treated differently in school or by society (especially when of 
different race from their parents), or may have incurred some stigma from adoption.   
Additionally, adoptive families may provide a different environment to their adopted children 
than to their biological children such as more (or less) attention to the adopted child.  As 
evidence of differences in the environment of adopted and natural children, Maughan et al 
(1998) find that adoptees performed more positively than non-adopted children from similar 
families on childhood tests of reading, mathematics, and general ability.  Bjorklund et al. 
(2006) uses a register of Swedish adoptees, which  allows  controls  for both natural and 
adoptive parents’ education. After correcting for the potential bias caused by non-randomness 
in this population, they find that genetics account for about 50% of the correlation in 
education between generations but also that the causal effect of adoptive parents’ education 
remains highly significant.  
  Finally, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) use the Minnesota Twins Register female 
twin pairs to examine education levels of their children (who are therefore cousins)  to 
eliminate the effects of “nurture”, and that part of the “nature” effect associated with the 
mother (together with some of the effects of father through the associative mating).  Based on 
simple least squares models using data on just the children and their mothers, they find large 
effects: one year of maternal schooling increased children’s years of education by 13% 
(approximately half a year) while the effect of paternal schooling was about twice as large.  
However the between-cousins estimates of maternal education effects, which therefore 
control for the genetic background of the cousins (at least through their mothers) are 
negative, albeit insignificantly so.  This contradicts the general view that maternal schooling 
has a positive effect on the achievement of their children
.. In a critical analysis of the 
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) data, Antonovics and Goldberger (2004) show that the 
results are quite sensitive to the selection of children who have completed education and who  
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are aged 18 and over, rather than 16 and over. However, Behrman, Rosenzweig and Zhang 
(2004) repeat the original analysis on a large Chinese dataset and find strong support for the 
earlier Minnesota analysis. Moreover, Bingley et al (2008), using the population of Danish 
twin mothers and their children, supports the finding of no effect in these studies using the 
Danish  identical  twins but, importantly, also shows that the conventional positive result 
continues to apply in the case of the non-identical twins. The suggestion in this study is that, 
once adequate control is made for unobservable differences, there is no intergenerational 
transmission. Furthermore, Bingley et al (2008), using an instrumental variable approach, 
attempts to address the issue that the difference in education of the twin mothers is not 
random. The results, for the identical twins, continue to show no correlation between 
maternal and child schooling.  
  Holmlund, Lindhal and Plug (2008) investigate whether the disparities in results are 
due to differences in the sample used or to the identification strategies. Using Swedish 
registered data they can implement the three methods, i.e. twins, adoptees and IV. Their 
results are consistent with the weight of the existing literature. In twin studies, the maternal 
effect is small and about half of the paternal education effect. This conclusion is reversed 
when using adoptee samples. When relying on IV to estimate the causal effect of parental 
education, the paternal effect is never significant but the maternal effect is quite large. They 
also find that there are non-linearities in the effect of education with the effect of parental 
education being larger at higher levels of education.  
The literature on the causal effects of parental earnings or incomes on educational 
outcomes is not as extensive as the literature on parental education.  Random assignment 
experiments are potentially informative but uncommon.  Blanden and Gregg (2004) review 
US and UK evidence on the effects of policy changes which largely focus on improving 
short-term family finances (see also Almond and Currie, 2009).  These include initiatives 
such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiments in the US, which provide financial 
support associated with higher housing costs from moving to more affluent areas.  MTO 
programs are associated with noticeable improvements in child behaviour and test scores, but  
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whether these are caused by the financial gain, changes in the physical environment, school 
effects, and/or peer-group changes remains unclear
2.  Other US work uses welfare-to-work 
reforms but again the income changes are accompanied by other behavioural changes – for 
example such reforms are aimed at increasing parental labour supply, which may also affect 
child attainment
3
Sibling-based studies exploit differential outcomes and incomes but it is far from clear 
that parents do not take compensatory actions in the face of differential financial resources 
associated with each sibling. If they do, then sibling studies estimate the effects net of those 
actions. Other studies look at value added in the form of changes in outcomes associated with 
variation in income over time to difference out unobserved heterogeneity. Similar studies use 
early measures of outcomes as controls for unobserved heterogeneity. However, estimation of 
such lagged dependent variable models are, in general, inconsistent in the presence of fixed 
child or family effects. Nor are they really very satisfactory ways of dealing with endogeneity 
because income may, itself, respond to lagged outcomes – for example, a failing child may 
stimulate a parent to work harder, to provide more financial resources to allow the child to 
improve. 
.  
In the absence of convincing experimental evidence, and because of doubts over the 
validity of sibling-based studies, instrumental variables have been used to identify the effect 
of parental income effects on child outcomes. Shea (2000) uses union status (and occupation) 
as an instrument for parental income. The identifying assumption is that unionized fathers are 
not more ‘able’ parents than nonunionized fathers with similar observable skills. Meyer 
(1997) uses variation in family income caused by state welfare rules, income sources, and 
income before and after the education period of the child, as well as changes in income 
inequality.  While strong identification assumptions are used in both these studies, they both 
 
2 Work on MTO by Sanbonmatsu et al (2004) suggests that MTO-driven neighbourhood effects on academic 
achievement were not significant. 
3 In the UK, the pilots of Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMA’s) provided a sizeable means tested cash 
benefit conditional on participation in education and paid, depending on pilot scheme, either to the parents or 
directly to the child (see Department for Education and Skills, 2002).  Enrollments increased by up to 6% in 
families eligible for full subsidies. However, this transfer was conditional on staying in school and so this 
reform is not directly informative about the effects of unconditional variations in income.  
 
8 
find that unanticipated changes in parental long-run income have only modest and sometimes 
negligible effects on the human capital of the children
4
Blanden and Gregg (2004), using UK data, find the correlation between family 
income and children’s educational attainment has actually risen between the British Cohort 
Study of children born in a particular week in 1970 and the later British Household Panel 
Survey data which contains children reaching 16 through the 1990’s.  They estimate the 
causal effect of family income in ordered probit models of child’s educational attainment 
(from no qualification up to degree level) based on sibling differences in the panel data.   
They also provide estimates of the probability of staying-on at school past the minimum age 
of 16.  However the paper cannot simultaneously provide estimates of the causal effect of 
parental education because this is treated as a fixed effect in the sibling difference estimates 
and thus differenced out.    
.  
Finally, Jenkins and Schluter (2002) is notable for being one of the few studies to 
control both for income, at various ages, and education. They study the type of school 
attended (vocational or academic), using a small German dataset, they find that later income 
is more important than early income, but that income effects are small relative to education 
effects. The analysis in their paper, as in Blanden and Gregg (2004), assumes the exogeneity 
of income and parental education.  
 
3.  Data, sample selection and sources of exogenous variation 
Research on this topic requires data on two family generations in a single data source – the 
education of the children and the education and incomes of their parents.  Our analysis is 
based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) - a quarterly survey of households in the U.K.  In 
each quarter there are roughly 160,000-120,000 respondents (more in earlier quarters) from 
 
4  Acemoglu and Pishke (2001) use similar arguments to Meyer (1997) and exploit changes in the family income 
distribution between the 1970’s and 1990’s.  They find a 10 percent increase in family income is associated with 
a 1.4% increase in the probability of attending a four-year college. Loken (2010) studies the long-term effect of 
family income on children's educational attainment using the Norwegian oil shock in the 1970s as an 
instrument. They find no causal relationship.  
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the approximately 65,000-50,000  households surveyed. Households are surveyed for five 
consecutive quarters.  We pool the data from households in the fifth quarter over the period 
1993-2006
5. Children aged 16 to 18 living at home are interviewed in the LFS, and so 
parental information can be matched to the child’s record
6
The key outcome of interest in this paper is the decision to participate in post-
compulsory schooling, defined as a dummy equal to one if the 16 to 18 year old child is 
either in post compulsory education at present or was in education between 16 and 18 but has 
left school at the time of interview (based on the age left full time education information in 
LFS).  Note that only 16 year olds who are surveyed between September and December are 
included to ensure information on their decision to leave or remain in education is available. 
The age range is limited because we need to observe respondents while they are still living at 
home in order to observe parental background (respondents are not asked directly about their 
parents).  An examination of BHPS data suggests that only 6% of children aged 16-18 have 
already left home.  However, this censoring in the LFS data becomes more severe with older 
teenagers - whilst 98% of 16-year-old children are observed living with both parents, this 
proportion in down to 88% for those 18 years old.
.  Our sub-sample consists of those 
children observed in LFS at ages 16 to 18 inclusive (and therefore have made their decision 
with respect to post compulsory education participation) which is approximately 43,000 
observations, or 4% of all LFS respondents (which corresponds closely to the population 
census data).  
7
 
5 Pre-1998, earnings data is available only for fifth wave respondents; from 1998 the earnings data is collected 
in the first and in the final wave. Prior to 1993 there was no earnings data in LFS. From 2006 one of our 
instrumental variables ceases to be available in the data. 
    We  also  drop observations from 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Although these regions changed their minimum school 
leaving ages at different times to England and Wales they also have quite distinct education 
6  Chevalier (2004) uses the Family Resource Survey data that, in many respects, is similar to the LFS data in 
this paper. Crucially, the LFS has information on union status which is potentially important for the 
identification strategy adopted in this paper. 





8.  The details of the original LFS data and the impact of the selection criteria can be 
seen in Table 1. We select teenagers where two parents are present
9, and where the father is 
working and reporting his income, where both parents were born after 1933 (and so were not 
affected by the earlier raising of the school leaving from 14 to 15, and whose school leaving 
is unlikely to have been directly affected by World War II), and where both parents were 
born in the United Kingdom, and are currently resident in England or Wales.  We make these 
restrictions in order to avoid including potentially endogenous factors that affect educational 
outcomes. Thus, our estimates need to be viewed as condition on these selections
10
Figures 1a and 1b show the participation rate in post-compulsory schooling in our 
final sample broken down by paternal and maternal education.  The education of the children 
appears closely correlated with the education of their parents, particularly up to a leaving age 
of 18; having parents with more education than this level does not substantially affect the 
staying-on probability of children which is then almost 100%
. We also 
drop any observations where there is missing data on the variables of interest and we trim the 
bottom 1% and top 5% of the paternal earnings distribution. 
11
Table 2 shows some selected statistics for the sample used in our analysis. The post-
compulsory schooling participation rate is 73% for boys and 83% for girls
. There are some sizable gaps 
between the participation of girls and boys from lower educated parents but these gaps 
narrow with parental education. 
12
 
8 The data records only region of current residence, not where the parents where educated. However, this is 
unimportant in our IV context.  Re-estimating including observations in NI and Scotland leads to a drop in 
precision but no change in the magnitudes of the key parameters. 
. There are large 
9  Whilst this may create some selection bias it would be difficult to overcome this in our data. Since parental 
separation is probably more likely for children with large (but unobservable) propensities to leave school early, 
and it is also likely to be negatively correlated with parental education and income we might expect to 
underestimate the effect of income and education on the dependent variables. We also examined the effects of 
living with a stepparent but found that, while there was a negative stepparent effect, the interaction between this 
and education or income proved insignificant. Results are available on request. 
10 In fact, the estimated coefficients of interest were not greatly affected by these selections.  
11 Note that there are only few parents with school leaving age of 17, 19, 20 and above 23. 
12  Official statistics from the Department for Children, Schools and Families show 67% of boys and 75% of 
girls in the relevant cohort choosing to stay so our own staying-on figures from LFS are a little higher reflecting 
the selections that we have made.    
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differences in the parental education and household income levels between those that remain 
in school compared to those that leave: more than one year extra parental education on 
average, and more than 20% higher paternal earnings.  
Parental income is potentially endogenous either because it is correlated with 
unobservable characteristics which are correlated with the child’s educational attainment, or 
because the parental education effect is transmitted through income. Shea (2002) estimates 
the impact of parental income using variation in income associated with union, industry, and 
job loss and finds a negligible impact on children’s human capital for most families (although 
parental income did seem to matter for families whose father has low education). We assume 
that union membership status creates an exogenous change in income, which is independent 
of parenting ability and the child’s educational choice.  Indeed the raw data, presented in 
Table 1, showed that children who stay on are just as likely to have unionized fathers as 
children who do not stay on in education.  We also exploit paternal occupation but mostly to 
control for differences in unionization rate by occupation.  Later, the estimates that we 
highlight are those that rely only on paternal occupation-union interactions as exclusion 
restrictions, (although we find a similar pattern of results when we also use union status alone 
as the exclusion restriction).  
Lewis (1986), and much subsequent work, demonstrates that wages vary substantially 
with union status, controlling for observable skills.  Figure 3 shows the kernel densities of the 
earnings of union member fathers and non-union fathers. The union/non-union earnings gap 
for fathers in our selected sample from the raw data is 8%. If union wage premia reflect rents 
rather than unobserved ability differences it seems plausible to make the (stronger) 
identifying assumption, used in this paper; that union status, controlling for occupation, is 
uncorrelated directly with the parental influence on educational outcomes of the children.  
Support for the view that unionization picks up differences in labour market productivity is 
mixed.  Murphy and Topel (1990) find that individuals who switch union status experience 
wage changes that are small relative to the corresponding cross-section wage differences, 
suggesting that union premia are primarily due to differences in unobserved ability.  However 
Freeman (1994) counters this view, arguing that union switches in panel data are largely 
spurious so that measurement error biases the union coefficient towards zero in the panel.  In 
any event, we are assuming, as in Shea (2002), that unionized fathers (and their spouses) are  
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not more ‘productive’ as parents than non-union fathers with similar observable skills and we 
have some evidence to suggest that parenting behaviour is not very different across union 
status of fathers.
13
Parental education is also likely to be endogenous. Here we rely on two sources of 
variation. Reforms to the minimum school leaving age have frequently been used as a source 
of exogenous variation – either exploiting natural experiments where different areas of a 
country changed their rules at different times, or using a national reform as a regression 
discontinuity by controlling for the smooth trends in school leaving, or considering just a 




13 The British Cohort Study (BCS) data, of all children born in England and Wales in a particular week in 1970, 
records, in considerable detail, the attitudes and behaviours of fathers towards their children. This data suggests 
small differences in attitudes and behaviours across union status. For example, 23% on unionised fathers 
disagreed with the statement that  “The needs of children are more important than one’s own”, compared to 18% 
of the non-unionised; 60% (62%) of children with unionised (non-unionised) fathers watched TV less than 2 
hours per day on a typical weekend day; 83% (88%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers read stories more than 
once per week 57% (52%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers always (as opposed to often/sometimes/never) 
talked to his child even when busy; 79% (79%) of unionised (non-unionised) fathers showed the child physical 
affection at least once per day and 36% (37%) praised the child at least once per day; 94% (95%)  of unionised 
(non-unionised) fathers has helped young children learn numbers, etc; and 79% (80%) of unionised (non-
unionised) fathers aspired for the child to continue in full-time education at age 16. The children also reported 
behaviour that might well reflect parenting styles. For example, 56% (54%) of the children of unionised (non-
unionised) fathers made their own bed and 49% (52%) cleaned their own room.  
 In this paper we identify the effect of 
parental education on children’s education using the exogenous variation in schooling caused 
by the raising of the minimum school leaving age (abbreviated as RoSLA: Raising of the 
School Leaving Age).  Individuals born before September 1957 could leave school at 15 
while those born after this date had to stay for an extra year of schooling.  This policy change 
creates a discontinuity in the years of education attained by the parents.   Figures 2a and 2b 
illustrate  this by showing mean years of schooling by birth cohort (in 4 month periods) 
around the reform date.  That is, we take a narrow window of birth cohorts around the reform 
(+/- four years) to minimize the influence of any long-term trends across birth cohorts. There 
is a marked jump in the graph for parents born after September 1957 which coincides with 
the introduction of the new higher school leaving age.  Note that between 30% and 40% of 
parents left school before the new minimum, so that the reform is biting and changes the 
14 See, for example, Harmon and Walker (1995) for the UK; Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) for Norway;  
and Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, (2006)  for the USA.   
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behaviour of a substantial fraction of individuals in the affected cohorts. Individuals affected 
by the new school leaving age have on average completed half a year more schooling than 
those born just before the reform. Chevalier et al. (2004) show that the effect of this reform 
was almost entirely confined to the probability of leaving at 15 relative to 16 – there is little 
effect higher up the years of education distribution. Hence, this reform only identifies a 
LATE for individuals with low levels of education. Table 2 shows that the proportion of 
fathers who were born before the RoSLA reform is higher than for mothers, reflecting their 
slightly greater age, and the table also shows that early leavers typically have slightly 
younger parents.   
A second source of variation  in parental schooling that we exploit derives from 
parental month of birth (exploited by Crawford et al. (2007)). There are several ways in 
which month of birth can affect the parents’ education levels: through entry timing, whole 
group teaching, developmental differences, and through peer effects. The academic year 
starts in September but the traditional admissions policy that reigned in the 1950’s and 
1960’s, when most of the parents in our data were young, allowed entry at the start of the 
term that the child turns 5 so that there were three points of entry each year: September, 
January and April/May. Thus the August born would start in April/May and have two fewer 
terms in primary school than their classmates. A school cohort would consist of children born 
within a 12-month window. In the 1950’s and 60’s whole class teaching was the dominant 
teaching method and development differences might imply that the youngest and the oldest 
might fare worse than the average. Peer effects might arise because the youngest might be 
dominated or intimidated by the oldest. The year group moves as a single unit through the 
academic system so that they sit examinations at same time and would be at different 
development ages when facing the same examination.  
Moreover, most of the parents in the data would have faced a selective schooling 
system where children were segregated into academic or vocational schools at the age of 11 
based on a single test conducted on the same day across the whole country - known as the 
11+ exam. Based on the results of this test, children were educated either in vocational or 
academic tracks. Children in the vocational track were more likely to leave school at the 
minimum compulsory age, while those for the latter could go on to higher secondary school 
and university (see Harmon and Walker, 1997). These two different types of schools placed 
quite different expectations on the children and there was very little movement between  
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school types after the age of 11. Figure 4 shows, by year of birth, the average age at which 
the parents in our data left full-time education for those who were September born, the eldest 
in their class cohort, compared to those who were July born, the youngest
15
 
.  The typical 
difference in years of schooling between the September and July born was around ¼ of a year 
for these cohorts born in the 50’s and 60’s. Notice that the gap closed completely for cohorts 
born in the early 1960’s when the 11+ examination was abandoned in most areas. So the 
month of birth effect in educational achievement seems to be mostly driven by the early 
tracking faced by these cohorts. 
4.  Estimates 
Our basic model of the impact of parental background on the post-compulsory 
schooling participation of their children is: 
(1)  ( ) , (, , ) γε ′ = ++ + + c mf h h c m f c PC a S S Y f DB DB DB Xδ  
where the c, m and p subscripts refer to the child, maternal and paternal characteristics within 
a particular household h.  The dependent variable PCc  is a dummy variable defining 
participation in post compulsory education.  This is estimated as a linear probability model to 
subsequently facilitate the use of instrumental variables
16, and is a function, a(.), of parental 
education levels measured in years of schooling of both the mother and father (Sm , Sf), and 




15 We use July rather than August for this comparison since there is likely to be some ambiguity with August-
born children to the extent that schools exercised discretion at the margin. 
. DB refers to date of birth (year and month) so that f(.) controls for cohort 
16 The marginal effects from probit estimation are very close to the linear probability model coefficient estimates 
and are available on request. 
17  Note that we use paternal income because the use of household income measures requires the inclusion of 
female earnings, which is potentially much more heavily affected by endogenous labour supply decisions.   
However its exclusion may also cause a bias if female labour supply is correlated with educational outcomes for 
children as well as with the variable of interest in the model.  We share our inability to resolve this problem with 
the rest of the literature.  If maternal labour supply is uncorrelated with paternal income and if incomes are 
shared within the household then our estimate of the effect of paternal income is the same as the effect of 
household income. This is clearly an important problem for future research.  
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trends in paternal, maternal and child education.  Three different specifications of X are used. 
First Xh contains characteristics common to all three members of the family (i.e. year and 
month of survey dummies as well as region of residence at time of survey).  Second, we 
additionally condition for paternal occupation, so that the difference in unionization between 
occupations does not identify the IV model. Third, we add union status, so that the 
identification in the IV model only comes from the interaction terms between union status 
and occupation. This then captures any differences in parenting behaviour that unionized 
father may have.  
  Table 3 summarizes our OLS estimates of paternal income and parental education 
levels, where a(.) is assumed to be linear, on the probability of post-compulsory schooling of 
the child
18.  Specification (1) only controls for parental years of schooling and suggests 
positive, if modest, paternal and maternal education effects on the schooling choice of both 
sexes.  The impact of a year of maternal education is an increase in the probability of post-16 
participation of about 3.3% for boys and 2.6% for girls – about one percentage point lower 
than reported in Chevalier (2004).  The impact of paternal education is somewhat lower and 
the effect on boys is larger than for girls. Specification (2) examines the impact of paternal 
income but excludes the parental education controls.  These estimates suggest sizable and 
significant income elasticities with the effect somewhat larger for boys (20%) than for girls 
(14%).  Finally specification (3) includes both education and income controls.   The direct 
effects of maternal education estimated in Specification (1) are reduced very slightly in (3), 
but the paternal education and income effects are reduced by a factor of approximately one 




18  We control for smooth cohort trends by including a cubic function of parents and child’s months/years of 
birth. Region controls are also included, as well as survey year dummies. Full results are available on request.  
Similar estimates based on probit models are also available. While multiple observations of closely spaced 
children in each household are possible their incidence is small (just 10% of individuals have at least one other 
sibling in the dataset) and any improvement in standard errors from exploiting the clustering in the data would 
be marginal. 
  
19  The estimated income effects here are closely comparable in magnitude to the results in Blanden and Gregg 
(2004). See their Tables 6 and 7 in particular.  
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The second set of estimates (4, 5, 6) in Table 3 adds the paternal occupation status (7 
dummies). This is potentially an endogenous variable, but since unionization rate differs by 
occupation, without controlling for occupation the union instrument would partially capture 
occupational choice which would invalidate its use. As expected, since parental occupation 
can be viewed as proxies for permanent income, the estimates on education are almost 
identical to those obtained when controlling for paternal income. Thus, in this specification, 
income is best interpreted as deviation from the permanent income. As such, the income 
effects are reduced by about 30% for boys and 50% for girls. Note, however, that when 
controlling for occupation, adding paternal income only marginally reduces the effect of 
paternal education on the educational attainment of children. Thus indicating that the 
correlation between paternal education and income mostly captures the permanent component 
of income, rather than income shocks. 
While we have tried to alleviate the concern that unionized fathers differ in their 
parenting behaviour, our final identification strategy relies only on the interactions  of 
paternal union membership and paternal occupation as instruments for paternal income.   
Thus, the final set of estimates in Table 3 show the effects of parental education and paternal 
earnings when controlling for the effects (not interacted) of paternal union membership and 
paternal occupation dummies in specifications (7), (8) and (9). The effects of parental 
education are virtually unchanged compared to the estimates presented in (4) and (6); 
supporting the view that paternal union membership has no direct effect on the education 
decision of his children. For girls, the effect of paternal income also remains unchanged 
compared to specifications (5) and (6) while for boys it decreases by less than one percentage 
point.  To summarise these results: the effect of parental education on the decision to remain 
in school past compulsory age appears to be quite small - around 3% for boys and 2% for 
girls, and larger for maternal education than parental education. The gap between the effect of 
maternal and paternal education increases when measures of, or proxies for, income  are 
introduced since the maternal education effect remains largely unaffected while paternal 
education effect drops by almost a half.  Note also that the income effects are severely 
reduced when a measure of permanent income is controlled for. 
To control for the potential endogeneity of paternal income and parental schooling we 
specify a set of first stage equations. We define dummy variables for RoSLA (born after the  
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critical date) and parental union membership (PUM),  and its interactions with the seven 
occupational categories, Occ, which are incorporated into our first stage model.  We also 
impose  a linear structure on the month of birth effect
20
(2) 
  by including a month of birth 
indicator,  MoB  (which takes the value of one  for September born  through to twelve  for 
August born). Therefore, in our preferred specification, we estimate a system of first stage 
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where the functions r(.), and s(.) control for smooth birth cohort trends in school leaving age 
so that the RoSLA acts as a regression discontinuity and picks up the effects of the reform.  
The system of equations defined above is over-identified and we estimated a wide 
variety of first stages and corresponding second stage equations to examine the sensitivity of 
the second stage estimates to the set of exclusion restrictions used to define the instrumental 
variables. Our IV estimates have the property, also a feature of the OLS estimates, that the 
addition of income to the model containing just parental education levels makes little 
difference to the estimates. Thus, we refrain from presenting specifications that contain just 
parental income or just parental education levels
21
 
20 Greater flexibility could be sought but at the cost, of course, of potential weakness in the instruments. 
. Table 4 shows different specifications of 
our three first stage equations. Each block refers to a different equation –  the paternal 
schooling equation, the maternal schooling equation, and the paternal log earnings equation. 
The columns show specifications that vary according to which sets of instruments are used. 
The three equations are estimated simultaneously and the F-statistics of the different sets of 
instruments are presented in the bottom panel of the table.  Comparing across the schooling 
equations we see that the inclusion of MoB is significant at 5% but makes little difference to 
the size and significance of the RoSLA effects.  In general, the raising of the school leaving 
21 These results are available on request.  
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age increased parental education by between 0.25 and 0.3 of a year, the effects being almost 
identical for both parents. The month of birth effect is also statistically significant and 
negative for both males and females.  An August born child, on average, left school one sixth 
of a year earlier than a September born child. The two instruments identify the effects of 
exogenous shocks to parental education through different mechanisms - so that in models 
where both set of instruments are included the estimates are almost identical to the ones 
obtained when the instruments are included individually.  So while both instruments identify 
a population of marginal students, these are not identical populations. The paternal earnings 
equation shows a significant positive union membership wage premium of 7% in columns 1, 
2 and 3, which are consistent with existing UK evidence.  In specifications 4, 5 and 6 the 
interactions of union membership and occupation show that the premium is larger for manual 
and less skilled occupations (the reference group being Managers and Senior Administrators). 
The corresponding F tests for the joint significance of all of the instruments used in each 
specification of the exclusion restrictions indicate whether the instruments are “weak”. The 
critical values of these F tests are reported in Stock and Yogo (2005) – the rule of thumb for 
the just identified case and one endogenous variable is approximately 10, with larger values 
for more exclusion restrictions.  Thus our  F tests vary from indicating instruments with 
considerable strength to being close to weak. 
Table 5 shows the second stage estimates
22
 
22 Table 5 reports only the OLS and IV estimates for the specifications labelled (6) and (9) in Table 3 but similar 
stability in the second stage results can be shown in the estimates for the equivalent of the other specifications  
presented in Table 3. 
. Specifications (a) and (b) replicate the 
OLS estimates from Table 3 when controlling for occupation only or for occupation and 
union status, respectively. The subsequent columns report the IV estimates for different 
specifications of the first stage. The pattern of second stage estimates of parental education 
effects seems remarkably stable across the IV specifications. The effect of paternal education 
is always imprecisely estimated when controlling for maternal education and paternal 
earnings regardless of which set of instruments is used and never statistically significant. 
Note though that the sign of the point estimates differs for sons and daughters. The effect of 
maternal education on daughters is between 0.187 and 0.212 depending on the instruments  
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used and is always significant at the 1% level, and significantly higher than the OLS estimate 
of 0.022. The magnitude of the effect of maternal schooling on the schooling of sons also 
increases greatly when instrumented and reaches 0.10 in all specifications but just failed to be 
statistically significant. Overall, the impact of maternal schooling on the schooling decisions 
of her children, and especially daughters, appear to be quite large. 
The effect of paternal earnings varies with the instruments used. When Paternal Union 
Membership alone is used as an instrument, the effect is roughly 0.26 for sons and 0.29 for 
daughters. If occupation, union membership and interactions of occupation and union 
membership are used, the effect of paternal income becomes larger for sons (0.32) but 
decreases (to 0.13) for daughters. However, in our preferred specification, when only the 
interactions of union and occupation are used as instrument and both union and occupations 
are controlled for, the effect of paternal income becomes much smaller  especially for 
daughters. Even if the point  estimates are still large for sons, they are  statistically 
insignificant at even the 10% level. Thus, paternal earnings, that we take as a measure of 
short term variation in the household income as we are controlling for occupation, have little 
impact on the schooling decisions of children. 
5.   Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the intergenerational transmission of education and 
investigated the extent to which early school leaving (at age 16) may be due to variations in 
permanent income and parental education levels.  Least squares revealed conventional results 
-  stronger effects of maternal than paternal education, and stronger effects on sons than 
daughters. We also found that the education effects remained significant even when 
household income was included. Income remains significant even when some measures of 
permanent income are included which indicates that some children could be financially 
constrained in their decision to attend post-compulsory education. 
When controlling for paternal income, the IV results reinforce the role of maternal 
education, especially for daughters, where the estimates increase almost ten fold. One year of 
maternal education, for mothers affected by our instruments, increases the probability of her 
daughter staying on by 20 percentage points. The effects on sons are only half of this and just 
on the border of statistical significance.  In contrast, paternal education has no statistical 
effect on the probability of remaining in educations for either son or daughter.     
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Accounting for the endogeneity of paternal income also increases the elasticity of 
income on schooling decisions, however depending on the set of instruments the effects is 
imprecisely estimated, and in our preferred specification becomes insignificant, even if a 
large point estimate is still found for sons. The income effects are in general larger for boys 
than for girls, this is also the case for the UK’s Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA).  
The  results imply that policy  options that are explicitly aimed at relieving credit 
constraints at the minimum school leaving age such as EMA (see Dearden et al., 2010 ) may 
not be so effective in promoting higher levels of education (a finding that is consistent with 
recent UK evidence that used linked administrative data for a cohort from age 11 to age 19 – 
see Chowdry et al, 2010). A policy of increasing permanent income, like increasing parental 
education (or say through Child Benefit) would on the other hand have some positive effects, 
especially for daughters. The recently proposed increase of the school leaving age to 18 
would also benefit future  generations through direct intergenerational transmission of 






Acemoglu, Daron. and Pischke, Jorn-Steffan (2001), “Changes in the Wage Structure, Family 
Income and Children’s Education”, European Economic Review,  45,  890–904. 
Almond, Douglas and Currie, Janet. (2009), “Human Capital Development before Age Five”, 
mimeo. 
Antonivics, Karen and Goldberger, Arthur (2005),.  “Does Increasing Women’s Schooling 
Raise the Schooling of the Next Generation? Comment”, American Economic Review, 
95, 1738-1744 
Behrman, Jere. (1997), “Mother’s Schooling and Child Education: A Survey.” University of 
Pennsylvania Department of Economics, DP 025. 
Behrman Jere and Rosenzweig, Mark (2002), “Does Increasing Women’s Schooling Raise 
the Schooling of the Next Generation.”  American Economic Review, 92,  323-334 
Behrman Jere, Rosenzweig, Mark and Zhang, J (2005),. “Does Increasing Women’s 
Schooling Raise the Schooling of the Next Generation. Reply”, American Economic 
Review,  95, 1745-1751. 
Bjorklund, Anders, Lindahl, Mikael and Plug, Erik (2006), “The Origins of Intergenerational 
Associations: Lessons from Swedish Adoption Data”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 121, 999-1028.  
Bjorklund, Anders and Salvanes, Kjell (2010), “Education and Family Background”, IZA 
Discussion Paper 5002. 
Black, Sandra E., Devereux, Paul J. (2010), “Recent Developments in Intergenerational 
Mobility”, National Bureau of Economic Research, WP15889.  
Black, Sandra E., Devereux, Paul J. and Salvanes, K.G. (2005), “Why the Apple Doesn't Fall 
Far: Understanding Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital”,  American 
Economic Review, 95, 437-449. 
Blanden, Jo and Gregg, Paul (2004),. “Family Income and Educational Attainment: A 
Review of Approaches and Evidence for Britain”,  Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 20, 245-263 
Cameron Stephen and Heckman, James J. (19898), “Life Cycle Schooling and Dynamic 
Selection Bias: Models and Evidence for Five Cohorts of American Males”, Journal 
of Political Economy, 106,  262-333 
Carneiro Pedro and Heckman, James J. (2004), “Human Capital Policy.”  In James J. 
Heckman and Alan B. Krueger, eds., Inequality in America.  Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Carneiro, Pedro, Costas Meghir and Matthias Parey (2007), “Maternal Education, Home 
Environments and the Development of Children and Adolescents”, IZA Discussion 
Paper No. 3072. 
Chevalier, Arnaud (2004), “Parental Education and Child's Education: A Natural 
Experiment”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1153,. 
Chevalier Arnaud, Harmon, Colm, Walker, Ian and Zhu, Yu (2004) “Does Education Raise 
Productivity or Just Reflect It?”, Economic Journal, 114,  F499-F517.  
 
22 
Chevalier Arnaud and Lanot, Gauthier (2002), “The Relative Effect of Family Characteristics 
and Financial Situation on Educational Achievement.” Education Economics,  10,  
165-182. 
Chowdry, Haroon, Crawford, Claire, Dearden, Lorraine, Goodman, Alissa; and Vignoles, 
Anna (2010), “Widening Participation in Higher Education: Analysis Using Linked 
Administrative Data.”  Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper W10/04. 
Currie, Janet and Moretti, Enrico (2003), “Mother’s Education and the Intergenerational 
Transmission of Human Capital: Evidence from College Openings and Longitudinal 
Data”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,  118,  1495-1532 
Dearden, Lorraine (2004), “Credit Constraints and Returns to the Marginal Learner”, Institute 
for Fiscal Studies, mimeo,. 
Dearden, Lorraine,  Emmerson, Carl, Frayne,  Christina  and Meghir, Costas. (2009) 
“Conditional Cash Transfers and School Dropout Rates.”  Journal of Human 
Resources, 44, 
Ermisch, John and Francesconi, Marco (2001), The effect of parents' employment on outcomes for 
children, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.  
Feldman Marcus W., Otto, Sarah P. and Christiansen, Freddy B. (2000), “Genes, culture and 
inequality” in Kenneth Arrow, Samuel Bowles and Steven Durlauf, eds., Meritocracy 
and Economic Inequality.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Freeman, Richard B. (1994), “H.G. Lewis and the Study of Union Wage Effects”, Journal of 
Labor Economics, 12,  143-149. 
Galindo-Rueda, Fernando (2003), “The Intergenerational Effect of Parental Schooling: 
Evidence from the British 1947 School Leaving Age Reform.”  Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics, mimeo. 
Gregg, Paul, Harkness, Susan and Machin, Stephen (1999), “Poor Kids: Child Poverty in 
Britain, 1966-1996.”  Fiscal Studies,  20, 163-187. 
Harmon Colm and Walker, Ian (1995), “Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling in 
the United Kingdom”, American Economic Review,  85,  1278-1286. 
Heckman, James J. and Masterov, Dimitri V. (2005), “Skills Policies for Scotland”. In Diane 
Coyle, Wendy Alexander and Brian Ashcroft (Eds). New Wealth for Old Nations: 
Scotland’s Economic Prospects, Princeton University Press. 
Holmlund, Helena, Mikael Lindahl, and Erik Plug (2008) “The Causal Effect of Parent's 
Schooling on Children's Schooling: A Comparison of Estimation Methods”, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 3630. 
Imbens, Guido and Angrist, Joshua (1994), “Identification and Estimation of Local Average 
Treatment Effects”, Econometrica,  62,  467-475 
Jenkins, Stephen P. and Schluter, Christian (2002), “The Effect of Family Income During 
Childhood on Later-Life Attainment: Evidence from Germany”, DIW Discussion 
Paper 317. 
Krueger, Alan B. (2004), “Inequality, Too Much of a Good Thing.”  In James J. Heckman 
and Alan B. Krueger, eds., Inequality in America, Cambridge: MIT Press  
 
23 
Lewis, H. Gregg (1986), . Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey,Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Loken,  Katrine, V. (2010), “Family income and children’s education: Using the Norwegian 
oil boom as a natural experiment”, Labour Economics, 17, 118-129. 
Maughan, Barbara, Collishaw, Stephan M. and Pickles, Andrew, (1998), “School 
Achievement and Adult Qualifications Among Adoptees: a Longitudinal Study.” 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 39,  669-686. 
Maurin, Eric and Sandra McNally. (2008),  “Vive la Révolution! Long Term Returns of 1968 
to the Angry Students”, Journal of Labour Economics 26, 1-33. 
Meyer, S. (1997), What Money Can’t Buy: Family Income and Children’s Life Chances, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Mulligan Casey (1999), “Galton Versus the Human Capital Approach to Inheritance.”   
Journal of Political Economy,  107,  184-224 
Murphy, Kevin and Topel, Robert (1990),  “Efficiency Wages Reconsidered: Theory and 
Evidence.” In Weiss, Y., Fishelson, G., eds., Advances in the Theory and 
Measurement of Unemployment, Macmillan: London, 204-242. 
Oreopoulous, Philip,  Page, M. and Stevens, A. (2006), “The Intergenerational Effects of 
Compulsory Schooling.” Journal of Labour Economics,  24, 729-760..  
Page, Marianne E. (2009), “Fathers’ education and children’s human capital: Evidence from 
the world war II G.I. Bill”, mimeo. 
Plug, Erik. (2004) “Estimating the effect of mother’s schooling and children’s schooling 
using a sample of adoptees”. American Economic Review, 94, 358-368. 
Sacerdote, Bruce (2007), “What Happens When We Randomly Assign Children to Families”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 119-157 
Sanbonmatsu, Lisa, Jeffrey, J.R., Kling, G.R., Duncan, G.J. and Brooks-Gunn, J. (2006), 
“Neighborhoods and Academic Achievement: Results from the Moving to 
Opportunity Experiment.”  Journal of Human Resources,  41, 649-691.  
Shea, John (2002), “Does Parents' Money Matter?”, Journal of Public Economics,  77, 155-
184 
Smith, Richard and Blundell, Richard (1986), “An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous 
Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply.” Econometrica, 54,  679-
686. 
Solon, Gary (1999),  “Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market”, in Orley Ashenfelter 
and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics – Vol. 3A,  Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
Stock, J. H., and M. Yogo. (2005), “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression”, 
in D.W. Andrews and J. H. Stock (eds), Identification and Inference for Econometric 
Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press. 
UK Department for Education and Skills (2002), “Education Maintenance Allowance: The 




















Figure 3: Distribution of father’s weekly earnings by union status 
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Age distribution:         
% aged 16  1.99  10.06  10.89  10.29 
% aged 17  33.82  47.45  48.94  46.87 
% aged 18  64.19  42.49  40.17  42.84 
         
% Staying on at 16  26.99  71.06  75.85  77.53 
% Attaining 5+ GCSE 
A*-C  39.68  67.16  76.54  78.07 
Observations:  2,836  9,035  31,103  8,367 
Note: The following are dropped from the penultimate column to form the final sample: 
families where father is not working or self employed or has no or missing  reported earnings 
(approximately nine thousand); families where one or both parents are immigrants 
(approximately five thousand); very old or very young parents (approximately four hundred); 
families residing in Scotland and in heavily oversampled Northern Ireland (approximately 
five thousand); observations missing other information (approximately fourteen hundred); 





 Table 2  Descriptive Statistics:  LFS 1992-2006 – Estimation Sample 
 
 




























Girls: N= 4024                   
Did not stay in full time education (17%):  6.04  15.93  15.93  45.41  43.52  0.31  0.23  0.41  17.32 
  (0.43)  (1.48)  (1.25)  (5.51)  (4.84)  (0.46)  (0.42)  (0.49)  (0.65) 
     Did stay in full time education (83%):  6.31  17.28  17.17  47.09  45.03  0.26  0.18  0.43  17.32 
  (0.50)  (2.61)  (2.23)  (5.08)  (4.49)  (0.44)  (0.38)  (0.50)  (0.65) 
     All  6.27  17.04  16.95  46.80  44.77  0.27  0.19  0.43  17.32 
  (0.50)  (2.50)  (2.15)  (5.19)  (4.59)  (0.44)  (0.39)  (0.50)  (0.65) 
Boys: N= 4343                   
    Did not stay in full time education (27%)  6.07  15.97  16.00  45.36  43.31  0.34  0.23  0.40  17.35 
  (0.45)  (1.45)  (1.25)  (5.04)  (4.62)  (0.47)  (0.42)  (0.49)  (0.64) 
     Did stay in full time education (73%)  6.33  17.49  17.33  47.05  45.10  0.24  0.16  0.43  17.32 
  (0.50)  (2.73)  (2.32)  (4.97)  (4.52)  (0.43)  (0.36)  (0.49)  (0.66) 
     All  6.26  17.08  16.97  46.60  44.62  0.27  0.18  0.42  17.33 
  (0.50)  (2.55)  (2.17)  (5.05)  (4.62)  (0.44)  (0.38)  (0.49)  (0.65) 




Table 3   Effects of Parental Education and Income on the Probability of Post-Compulsory Schooling of Children 
Specification:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
BOYS: N=4343                   
Maternal School Leaving Age  0.033    0.031  0.029    0.029  0.029    0.028 
  0.004    0.004  0.004    0.004  0.004    0.004 
Paternal School Leaving Age  0.025    0.017  0.014    0.012  0.014    0.012 
  0.003    0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003    0.003 
Paternal Log Earnings    0.195  0.123    0.113  0.085    0.105  0.078 
    0.014  0.015    0.016  0.016    0.017  0.017 
GIRLS: N= 4024                   
Maternal School Leaving Age  0.026    0.024  0.022    0.022  0.022    0.022 
  0.003    0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003    0.003 
Paternal School Leaving Age  0.016    0.010  0.008    0.007  0.008    0.007 
  0.003    0.003  0.003    0.003  0.003    0.003 
Paternal Log Earnings    0.14  0.093    0.068  0.049    0.065  0.047 
    0.013  0.014    0.015  0.015    0.015  0.016 
Controls for paternal union membership    no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  Yes 
Control for paternal occupation  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Note: LFS 1992-2006.  Standard errors in italics.  Specifications 1, 2 and 3 include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, 




























Paternal RoSLA  0.270     0.250  0.278     0.258 
  0.098    0.099  0.102    0.102 
Paternal MoB    -0.015  -0.014    -0.015  -0.013 




















Maternal RoSLA  0.278     0.255  0.284     0.261 
  0.08    0.08  0.08    0.081 
Maternal MoB    -0.016  -0.014    -0.016  -0.014 



















Paternal Union Membership (PUM)  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.049  0.049  0.049 
  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.018  0.018  0.018 
PUM *Professional        0.009  0.009  0.009 
        0.027  0.027  0.027 
PUM*Lower Professional         0.005  0.004  0.004 
        0.032  0.032  0.032 
PUM*Admin & Secretarial        0.102  0.102  0.102 
        0.043  0.043  0.043 
PUM*Skilled Trade         0.106  0.106  0.106 
        0.027  0.027  0.027 
PUM*Personal Services        0.304  0.304  0.304 
        0.042  0.042  0.042 
PUM*Machine Operatives        0.117  0.117  0.117 
        0.028  0.028  0.028 
PUM*Elementary Occupations        0.208  0.208  0.208 



















RoSLA  8.88, 0    7.44, 0  9.00, 0    7.58, 0 
MoB     6.57, 0  5.13, 0.01    6.21, 0  4.79, 0.01 
RoSLA and MoB      7.01, 0      6.90, 0 
Occ        290.14, 0  290.14  290.14, 0 
             
PUM  59.82, 0 59.82, 0  59.82, 0  7.28, 0.01 7.28, 0.01  7.28, 0.01 
PUM, Occ., PUM*Occ.        187.39,0  187.39,0  187.44, 0 
PUM*Occ.        13.34, 0  13.34, 0  13.34, 0 
PUM, PUM*Occ        37.24, 0  37.24, 0  37.24, 0 
             
Parental Education IVs, PUM  25.8,0  24.25, 0  17.54, 0  8.43, 0  6.56, 0  6.98, 0 
Parental Education IVs, PUM, Occ, 
PUM*Occ 
      166.47,0  166.1, 0  149.46, 0 
Parental Education IVs, PUM*Occ        12.38, 0  11.77, 0   11.00, 0 
Parental Education IVs, PUM, PUM*Occ        31.58  31.021  27.11,0 
             
Note: Standard errors in italic. The models also include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, dummies of 
child’s date of birth, dummies in the date of birth of both parents in five year intervals and dummies for paternal 
occupation.  RoSLA is a dummy for the Raising of School Leaving Age, MoB stands for Month of birth (a linear 
function on month with September = 1 to August = 12); PUM is Paternal Union Membership Status; and Occ is 





Table 5  Instrumental Variable Estimates: LFS 1992-2006 
Specification:  a  b  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Instruments    -  RoSLA  RoSLA  RoSLA  RoSLA  RoSLA  RoSLA 
        Mob    MoB    MoB 
      PUM  PUM  PUM  PUM     
          PUM*Occ  PUM*Occ  PUM*Occ  PUM*Occ 
Second stage controls    PUM          PUM  PUM 
  Occ  Occ  Occ  Occ  Occ  Occ  Occ  Occ 
BOYS: N=4343                  
Maternal School Leaving Age  0.029  0.028  0.102  0.101  0.102  0.102  0.102  0.102 
  0.004  0.004  0.059  0.058  0.059  0.058  0.059  0.058 
Paternal School Leaving Age  0.012  0.012  0.026  0.021  0.028  0.023  0.037  0.031 
  0.003  0.003  0.046  0.044  0.045  0.043  0.046  0.044 
Paternal Log Earnings  0.085  0.078  0.258  0.261  0.317  0.319  0.214  0.219 
  0.016  0.017  0.092  0.092  0.078  0.078  0.140  0.140 
GIRLS: N=4024                 
Maternal School Leaving Age  0.022  0.022  0.214  0.189  0.212  0.188  0.211  0.187 
  0.003  0.003  0.055  0.053  0.055  0.054  0.055  0.054 
Paternal School Leaving Age  0.007  0.007  -0.091  -0.061  -0.067  -0.040  -0.061  0.04 
  0.003  0.003  0.044  0.041  0.043  0.040  0.043  0.04 
Paternal Log Earnings  0.049  0.047  0.286  0.274  0.136  0.129  0.063  0.052 
  0.015  0.016  0.08  0.08  0.071  0.07  0.092  0.091 
Notes:  Standard errors in italics.  All second stage specifications include year of survey dummies, regional dummies, dummies of child’s date of birth, and dummies in the date 
of birth of both parents in five year intervals.  RoSLA is a dummy for the Raising of School Leaving Age, Mob stands for Month of birth (linear), PUM for Paternal Union 
Status, and Occ for Paternal occupation (7 categories) 
 
 